This paper examines the performance characteristics of private equity investments, using return data from the National Venture Capital Association database. Our study indicates that private equity investments are far riskier than public equity investments. In addition to the conventional risks of the securities markets, private equity investments entail significant and unique risks, including a long investment horizon, rigid liquidity constraints, and high bankruptcy rates among portfolio companies. There is a widespread perception that successful private equity investments can provide both exceptional returns and enhanced portfolio diversification. Our findings indicate that superior performance is possible, but that returns can be difficult to realize. Our findings also suggest that diversification should not be considered a major benefit of private equity investing. Rather, private equity should be treated as but one small component of a portfolio's allocation to all equity investments, private and public.
Understanding Private Equity
The organized private equity market has grown rapidly since the issuance of the "prudent expert rule" by the U.S. Department of Labor in 1978, which allowed pension funds and other institutions to invest in private equity. In broad terms, this asset class includes the unregistered securities of private and public companies. Private equity investments typically occur through a limited partnership that is managed by a general partner and largely funded by investors who constitute limited partners. The major categories of private equity investing include venture capital funds, buyout funds, mezzanine funds, and distressed securities funds. These vehicles are defined in Table 1 .
Despite a widespread perception that successful private equity investments can provide both exceptional returns and enhanced portfolio diversification, our research indicates that these conclusions reflect an incomplete understanding of the nature of private equity returns. In fact, these vehicles can offer both more and less opportunity to investors than the industry's limited and idiosyncratic performance data suggest. Reported private equity returns often grossly understate the returns produced by successful private equity investments and grossly overstate their diversification benefits. This paper examines the life cycle of private equity investments and the measures used to evaluate their performance, with the aim of enhancing understanding of private equity's risk and return characteristics. Investors can use this analysis to make better-informed decisions about the role of private equity in their asset allocations. Early-Stage Funds Venture capital funds that invest in the portfolio companies for their product development, initial marketing, manufacturing, and sales activities.
Balanced Funds Venture capital funds that invest in the portfolio companies in a variety of stages of development.
Later-Stage Funds
Venture capital funds that invest in the portfolio companies that are producing, shipping, and increasing their sales volume.
(Leveraged) Buyout Fund Funds that invest in more-established portfolio companies with positive cash flows for purposes of acquisition (utilizing a significant amount of debt).
Small $0-$250 million Medium $250-$500 million Large $500-$1,000 million Mega $1,000 million +
Mezzanine Funds
Funds that provide venture financing to portfolio companies shortly before a public offering.
Distressed Securities Funds
Funds that invest in securities, principally debt instruments, of financially troubled corporations.
Source: Venture Economics/NVCA.
Reported private equity returns often grossly understate the returns produced by successful private equity investments and grossly overstate their diversification benefits.
We also review the pros and cons of the two primary private-equity investment vehicles: limited partnerships and funds of funds-funds that own shares in several different private equity partnerships.
The Private Equity Life Cycle
Measuring the returns from private equity is complicated by the very nature of the asset class. For much of the life of a private equity investment, there is no market price for the holding. The stages of a successful investment in a portfolio company are illustrated in Figure 1 . Until the beginning of the initial public offering (IPO) process or until the company is purchased privately by a strategic buyer, an investment's value is estimated by the manager of the fund that holds the investment. Not until the IPO is completed-turning the private equity into public equity-is there a reliable, market-based price for the investment. Although the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) has created guidelines for evaluating the net asset value (NAV) of private equity investments, the group has no legal power to enforce compliance. (The NVCA guidelines are summarized in Table 2 .) A more significant problem is that NAVs can be distorted. For instance, fund managers engage in stale pricing, by which they assign old values to investments even if evidence of a change in value exists; or they practice managed pricing, by which they price their private investments subjectively. 1 Figure 1 . Life of a successful investment in a portfolio company Generating cash 30% discount to the P/E ratio of similar companies on the public equity market.
Public
During the restricted Start with a 30% discount to the (restricted period P/E ratio of similar public securities) companies and eliminate discount proportionately as the restricted period lapses.
Out of restricted period 10% discount to market price due to low liquidity.
Fund NAVs and any distributions can be used to determine an investment's total return for any one specific period in the same way that a one-period return is calculated for public equities. Because there is no sound basis for estimating reinvestment returns of stock and cash distributed by private equity funds, however, these one-period returns can't be compounded to create a picture of longerterm performance. A private equity fund's cash and stock distributions cannot be reinvested in the same fund at the NAV that is recorded on the day those distributions are made.
Private Equity Performance Standards: IRR and DPI
To measure a private equity fund's return over multiple periods without compounding one-period returns, we use the internal rate of return (IRR). Even this measure has a limitation, however. IRR assumes that cash distributions in all periods will have the same rate of return as the initial investment. Among the performance data published by Venture Economics/NVCA, the most-watched measure is the cumulative IRR since inception, 2 the standard recommended by the Association for Investment Management and Research. The IRR is calculated for each fund as cash inflow and cash outflow to the investors on a year-to-year basis, as well as the estimated value of the portfolio's remaining companies. Although the Venture Economics/NVCA database is the most comprehensive one available, it has significant drawbacks: the data are self-reported, reporting is optional, and the data may not always include the same group of funds. Also, Venture Economics/NVCA updates current and historical data as they become available, which can lead to significant "revisions of history. " Tables 3 and 4 where Io is the initial investment, Ct is the net distribution at time t, and NAVT is the estimated net asset value if there are still illiquidated holdings.
Private Equity: Essential characteristics
• Private equity offers potentially extraordinary returns, but the caveats are many. Private equity investments can produce striking gains. However, because of the unique nature of private equity's return distributions, industry data could understate this potential. Indeed, the greatest returns in this asset class are typically realized when the private equity becomes public equity. Even then, however, securities regulations can make it difficult to realize these returns in a timely-and profitablemanner.
• Private equity provides minimal diversification benefits. Although private equity returns appear to have low correlations with the public equity markets, those apparently low correlations largely reflect estimated returns that can't be realized. The returns that can be realized are in fact highly correlated with the performance of the public stock markets.
• Private equity is very risky. In addition to the conventional risks of the financial markets, private equity's unique risks include a long (and unknowable) investment horizon, liquidity constraints, and a high bankruptcy rate among portfolio companies.
• Private equity is a closely related complement of, not an alternative to, public equity. The opportunity to realize returns from private equity is highly correlated with the performance of the public stock market, suggesting that private equity is not an "alternative asset" but a unique component of the overall equity market, including both private and public equity.
("Highest") earned an average cumulative IRR of 722.3% (see Table 3 ).
Also presented in Tables 3 and 4 are three average returns for the entire sample size in each period: simple average, capital weighted average, and pooled average. The pooled average treats all funds as a single fund by summing their annual investments and cash and stock distributions together. This total-distribution flow series is then used to calculate the internal rate of return. The pooled average is the most meaningful measure of performance for a fund of private equity funds. The capital weighted average is more influenced by the estimated NAVs. The average and standard deviation figures at the bottom of the tables are the statistics for the periods ended December 31, 1985 , through June 30, 2002 .
Although these internal rates of return offer a basis for evaluating different funds' long-term performance within a universe of private equity To compare the realized long-term return of private equity with that of public equity, it is more appropriate to use distribution to paid-in ratio (DPI) since inception. DPI is defined as total distributions divided by total capital invested. For example, Table 5 on page 8 shows that by the end of 2001, the 61 private equity funds that began operations in 1985 had distributed cash and stock equal to 2.5 times the amount of money invested in the funds since their inception. By contrast, a dollar invested in the Dow Jones Industrial Average would have increased by more than 13-fold over the period.
DPI does not assign a "time value" to distributions or investments made at different stages of a fund's life. A dollar invested ten years ago is treated the same as a dollar invested ten days ago. DPI basically measures two things: the realized return assuming no reinvested distributions; and the number of years it has taken the fund to provide this cumulative return. DPI is considered the most conservative measure, since it excludes subjective evaluation of NAV and assumes no reinvestment returns from distributions-the two factors that make the IRR measure less reliable. In short, DPI provides a "clean" measure of the return of private equity funds. Table 5 shows the reported DPIs for the groups of funds by their "vintage years. " 3 Also presented are the final values at the end of 2001 for a dollar invested in different public equity markets at the beginning of the vintage years. As you would expect, the longer-established funds have returned more of-and more on-their investments.
On average, it took about five to six years for a private equity fund to make distributions equal to the cumulative investments in the funds, and about ten years to make distributions equal to twice the original investments. A comparison of DPI figures with the cumulative values of public equity benchmarks by vintage year seems to suggest that an index fund with a reasonable fee can easily beat an average private equity fund. It is important to note, however, that unlike the total returns of public equity benchmarks, the DPI figures include no reinvestment of fund distributions.
IPOs: The Missing Link
Understanding the characteristics of private equity valuation, IRR, and DPI is critical to making informed portfolio decisions about private equity, but in a 
Buyout/Mezzanine funds versus venture capital funds
According to pooled averages from NVCA, buyout/ mezzanine funds produced higher returns than venture capital funds for the periods ended December 31, 1985 , through December 31, 2000 . Before 1994 , even the top 20% of venture capital funds failed to perform as well as the same group of buyout/mezzanine funds. Since 1995, the top-quintile venture capital funds have reported impressive returns, but the upper and median venture capital funds still fall behind those of the same groups of buyout/mezzanine funds. Because the portfolio companies in buyout/mezzanine funds tend to be more established, with many generating free cash flow and earning profits, buyout/mezzanine funds may be more appealing to relatively conservative investors. sense these figures are really a side show. Private equities' main event is the initial public offering, though some portfolio companies are sold to strategic buyers privately. When private equity becomes public equity, the returns can be tremendous. Although private equity funds distribute some cash, most of their returns depend on stock distributions that typically occur when portfolio companies are sold to the investing public.
One measure of the IPO's significance is the instant return rate, the change in price between a portfolio company's IPO offer price and its post-IPO offer price at the end of the first trading day. (Figure 2) . The instant return of buyout IPOs, by contrast, was not impressive, except for a few years in the later 1980s (Figure 3) . In a private equity fund, venture capital IPOs' potential as a 
More performance caveats
In theory, it may be possible to measure the total return of a portfolio company from its founding to its eventual trading in the public stock market, but to our knowledge, such data do not exist. Even if such data were available, the calculation would still fail to reflect the implications of SEC Rule 144, which requires that all restricted/controlled shares (which would include most private equity portfolio companies) have a one-year holding period before they can be sold to the public without full registration. And after the one-year period, there are restrictions on the volume of shares that can be sold. In addition to the SEC regulation, the source of enormous return usually is not fully reflected by the IRR and the DPI, because these calculations incorporate the value of the remaining holdings in a private equity fund that have not yet gone public. Paradoxically, being a long-term investor in a private equity fund may be a condition necessary to realize significant "instant" returns, simply because shares in the portfolio companies are not widely available to the investing public at the IPO's offer price. investment bankers underwriting the IPO generally enter into contractual lockups that preclude the private equity fund from selling its shares for 180 days post IPO. Finally, the market's recognition that eager sellers are most likely waiting in the wings to unload their IPO shares can depress a stock's value in the period after its IPO.
Indeed, there is evidence that venture capital companies underperform major stock market benchmarks over a longer time horizon (five to ten years). The Post Venture Capital Index (PVCI), published by NVCA, consistently lags major market indexes such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the Standard & Poor's 500 Index, and the Nasdaq Composite Index. Loughran and Ritter (1995) compared the performance of 4,753 companies issuing IPOs or SEOs (seasoned equity offerings) from 1970 to 1990 with a matching sample. On average, the five-year cumulative return for the new companies was 44% lower than that for a sample of "matching companies" (companies with similar market capitalizations, but which had been public companies for the previous five years).
The conclusion to be drawn from all these caveats and qualifications is that the private equity industry's measure of performance-cumulative IRR since inception-may differ dramatically from the returns that can be realized by investors in public or private equity markets. The difference will largely depend on how NAVs of residual holdings are estimated and how liquid the holdings of public shares are. Unfortunately, data to confirm this intuition are hard to come by. 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 125% 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 June 2002 Private equity provides only minimal diversification benefits
Private equity IRRs may suggest that the performance of this asset class is weakly correlated with the returns of the public equity markets, indicating a diversification benefit from a meanvariance portfolio theory perspective. Indeed, emphasizing private equity's diversification is a key "marketing" strategy in the private equity industry, and among providers of alternative assets generally. Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients between the IRRs of various private equity subcategories and the total returns of public equity benchmarks from 
through 2001. Except for the Russell 2000
Value Index, the table shows that stock market benchmark returns have a low, but uniformly positive, correlation with returns of private equity portfolios. We believe that these low-but-positive correlations overstate private equity's value as a diversifier, for two reasons: first, the low liquidity of private equity investments; and, second, and more important, the fact that these NAVs can, for the most part, be realized only in the public equity markets. Figure 4 , on page 12, shows the number of IPO deals and the annual returns of the Nasdaq Composite Index from 1985 through June 2002. The annual number of IPOs generally follows the stock market's movements with a delay that reflects the time necessary to plan and execute the IPO. When the stock market is strong, the number of IPOs rises. When the stock market is weak, the number of deals declines, preventing investors from realizing returns on their private equity investments.
This relationship means that the opportunity to transform a private equity fund's illiquid NAVparticularly a venture capital fund's illiquid NAV-into tradable securities depends on the performance of the Nasdaq stock market. Although private equity returns can be higher, and their risks more severe, the factors driving the performance of private equity are the same ones that determine the performance of the public stock market. When deciding how much of your portfolio to devote to private equity, it's useful to view this investment as just one small component of your larger equity allocation.
Private equity's unique risks
As their effectively high, yet not totally visible, correlations suggest, private equity investments share many systematic market and economic risks with public equity. These investments also entail a greater level of company-specific risk. Public information about prospective portfolio companies is limited, and the entrepreneurial initiatives of such companies are unproven. In addition, the cost of basic information about private equity holdings is much higher than the same cost for public equity, and the private equity market's scarcity of information and its illiquidity make it difficult to buy or sell these investments in response to a company's changing fortunes.
The major risk factors associated with private equity investments can be summarized as follows:
• Bankruptcy Risk. As the total return data presented in Tables 3 and 4 Investors need to ensure that the general partners are properly motivated to maximize investors' returns. While general partners get reimbursed for the cost of managing the funds, the bulk of their compensation should be performancebased. When the spoils are divided, the general partner retains a "carried interest, " or a proportionusually 20%-of the fund's returns. This arrangement is commonplace, but it's important to recognize that the general partner's limited exposure to "bankruptcy" risk, and his or her strong incentive to maximize the return on the firm's capital, can create a conflict of interest. For example, the manager has a strong incentive to take outsized risks in an already-risky asset class, but pays a relatively small penalty for any risks gone bad.
To manage the risk of misaligned incentives between general and limited partners, it's sensible to invest in private equity through a fund of funds. This "secondary" market is small, with an estimated $2 billion to $4 billion in net assets in funds-of-funds. 125% 1985 125% 1986 125% 1987 125% 1988 125% 1989 125% 1990 125% 1991 125% 1992 125% 1993 125% 1994 125% 1995 125% 1996 125% 1997 125% 1998 125% 1999 125% 2000 125% 2001 125% June 2002 NASDAQ annual total return (right axis) Source: Venture Economics/NVCA, October 2002 October . 1985 October 1986 October 1987 October 1988 October 1989 October 1990 October 1991 October 1992 October 1993 October 1994 October 1995 October 1996 October 1997 October 1998 October 1999 private equity funds in 2000 alone. There are three major benefits of investing through a fund of private equity funds:
1. Diversifying sector/manager risks. By spreading private equity assets among different managers and across different sectors, a fund-of-funds can limit the risk of investing with a bad partner or of targeting the wrong sector. 2. Reducing bankruptcy risk and enhancing performance. Because funds-of-funds may be able to buy and sell fund shares among themselves, they can theoretically evaluate investments already made by a fund's general partner, thereby reducing the bankruptcy risk. It may also be possible to buy a share in a limited partnership at a deep discount to its net asset value, thereby enhancing the fund-of-funds' total return. In practice, however, there's little evidence that these benefits are realized. 3. Providing a lower threshold for participation.
Funds-of-funds provide investors access to private equity funds by lowering the minimum capital commitment, sharing the high costs of gathering and analyzing information about the industry's many highly specialized partnerships, and contracting with and monitoring general partners. The benefits of professional management and cost reduction are much more significant than in the funds-of-funds that are familiar to most mutual fund investors-vehicles that buy shares in other mutual funds and then tack on additional management fees.
The disadvantage of a fund-of-funds is, not surprisingly, cost. These vehicles usually charge annual fees of 1% of assets on top of the management fees and carried interest collected by the general partners of the various private equity funds. However, because of the risky and highly specialized nature of investing in private equity, as well as the high costs of gathering and analyzing information about the industry's many highly specialized partnerships, the additional cost of a fund-of-funds is not an oppressive burden.
Summary
Private equity's unique and limited performance data have led to some common misunderstandings about the role of this asset class in a portfolio. Successful private equity investments can provide exceptional returns, but those returns can also be difficult to measure, to project, and to realize. Private equity also provides only minimal diversification benefits. The relatively high correlation between stock market benchmarks such as the Nasdaq Composite Index and the opportunity to realize returns from private equity suggests that private equity investments produce, at least implicitly, patterns of return similar to those of public equity. Although there are significant differences-private equity is illiquid, and the magnitude of its returns and risks is significantly higher-it's sensible to consider this asset class as one component of a portfolio's overall equity allocation.
The goal in negotiating a contract is to align the interest of general partners with that of investors-but striking the right balance can be tricky.
